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Abstract A continuing need for care for elderly, com-
bined with looser family structures prompt the question
what ﬁlial obligations are. Do adult children of elderly
have a duty to care? Several theories of ﬁlial obligation are
reviewed. The reciprocity argument is not sensitive to the
parent–child relationship after childhood. A theory of
friendship does not offer a correct parallel for the rela-
tionship between adult child and elderly parent. Arguments
based on need or vulnerability run the risk of being unjust
to those on whom a needs-based claim is laid. To compare
ﬁlial obligations with promises makes too much of parents’
expectations, however reasonable they may be. The good
of being in an unchosen relationship seems the best basis
for ﬁlial obligations, with an according duty to maintain the
relationship when possible. We suggest this relationship
should be maintained even if one of the parties is no longer
capable of consciously contributing to it. We argue that this
entails a duty to care about one’s parents, not for one’s
parents. This implies that care for the elderly is not in the
ﬁrst place a task for adult children.
Keywords Filial obligations  Care  Elderly parents 
Adult children  Ethics  Health care policy
Introduction
In most cultures, some care for elderly parents by adult
children is generally expected. These expectations may be
found among elderly parents or adult children, in social
norms and in the practice of allocation decisions for state-
funded home help. Expectations of different parties often
do not converge, which brings up the question what
expectations are legitimate in the relationship between
adult child and elderly parent.
A number of demographic trends increase the need for a
clariﬁcation of ﬁlial expectations or obligations. In the
future, there will be a larger percentage of elderly in our
population (CBS 2009). Even if it is probable that they will
be in better health than generations of elderly before them
(Perenboom et al. 2004), it may be assumed that some forms
of help will remain needed. At the same time, smaller
nuclear families limit the availability of adult children
for support giving. Furthermore, many nuclear families
undergo changes in their composition over the course of
their existence: divorces lead to the loss of a cohabiting
parent, and new partnerships may introduce stepparents,
stepsiblings and half siblings. An account of obligations of
adult children towards elderly parents needs to allow for a
variety of situations. In addition, western cultures nowadays
are characterized by a high degree of individualization, in
which being independent and developing one’s own
capacities is highly valued. The provision of support to
family members, neighbors or friends is not self-evident
under a doctrine of individualism, and the question what a
correct interpretation of ﬁlial obligations ought to be
becomes even more pressing.
We will present ﬁve theories of ﬁlial obligations, dis-
cussed in the literature over the past decades: ﬁlial obli-
gations based on reciprocity, friendship, needs, an implicit
promise and an argument based on the special goods that
are derived from being in a parent––child relationship. We
ﬁnd the best arguments for ﬁlial obligations in the ‘special
goods argument’, but these ﬁlial obligations are limited to
maintaining the relationship.
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The argument of reciprocity
A popular idea of why we have obligations towards our
elderly parents is that of reciprocity (Blieszner and Hamon
1992; Dykstra and Fokkema 2007): adult children owe
something to their elderly parents because their parents
have done much for them. Among these could be the fact
that parents brought children into existence, nurtured them,
educated them, and provided them with material things,
among which the most basic ones of food, clothes and
shelter: in short, they have created the conditions for
children to exist and to use their capabilities. The idea that
adult children owe their parents something in return can be
viewed as a commonsense moral belief: it is a belief ‘‘that
is entrenched in our moral framework and has been passed
on through generations’’, it functions as a ‘‘basic premise in
our moral practices’’, and it ‘‘expresses a legitimate
expectation within a particular moral practice’’, i.e. it is a
norm ‘‘that goes without saying’’ (Van den Hoven 2006,
p.44).’
The idea that ﬁlial obligations are based on reciprocity
may be widely shared in the public, but is strongly criti-
cized by several scholars (e.g. (Collingridge and Miller
1997; English 1979)). These scholars bring forward that it
is not at all clear what it is that children need to do ‘in
return’ for their parents’ upbringing. Keller (2006) distin-
guishes owing a ‘‘debt’’ from owing ‘‘gratitude’’, and ﬁnds
both metaphors inadequate. ‘Debt’ refers to returning
something on the basis of what is received, which at least
two other authors ﬁnd an inappropriate parallel for the
exchange of favors between parents and children (English
1979; Wicclair 1990). English claims that a debt comes
into existence in response to a favor
1, and that the proper
way to discharge a debt is to return the favor with a favor
of equal magnitude. Wicclair (1990) adds that for debts, it
should be clear when they can be considered to be ‘dis-
charged’, which is not the case for ﬁlial obligations. Eng-
lish rejects the idea of the parent–child relationship as one
in which favors are exchanged. She claims that past
parental sacriﬁces are as good as irrelevant when the
relationship between adult children and elderly parents is
considered, and that the current relationship is what really
matters (see below for a discussion of the friendship model
of ﬁlial obligation). Wicclair instead asserts that not debt
but gratitude is the appropriate basis of ﬁlial obligations. In
contrast to debts which are determined by how much is
received, gratitude is indeterminate and is responsive to the
receiver’s needs. In addition, gratitude is owed also for
unrequested favors (Wicclair 1990, p. 175), thus taking the
sting out of English’ argument which states that it is not
possible to owe parents a ‘debt’ on the basis of unrequested
favors. Keller, however, in discussing the argument of
gratitude, rejects it as the ground for ﬁlial obligations
stating that ‘‘(duties of gratitude) are duties to show that
you feel appropriately grateful (or perhaps to act as you
would if you did feel appropriately grateful) for a given
beneﬁt’’ (2006, p. 257) whereas ‘‘ﬁlial duties are direct
duties to help, respect, please or beneﬁt parents’’ (Keller
2006, p. 259). In other words, showing gratitude is not
enough––ﬁlial obligations require actions.
When we think about the argument of reciprocity as a
commonsense moral belief, this belief does probably not
involve keeping a checkbook of what is given and
received, nor the notion that exactly that should be given
which is received. It cannot be meant to imply the repay-
ment of a debt in the literal sense, and to portray the
argument thus makes it a caricature. The arguments against
this norm are probably best understood in a context of
duties and corresponding rights. The indeterminate nature
of duties based on a broad interpretation of ‘debt’ or on
gratitude makes it hard to deﬁne corresponding rights of
parents to receiving a certain kind of support from their
children. In the absence of such strict duties and rights, it
would be hard to build policies based on such duties. But it
would still be possible to defend the existence of an
indeterminate, imperfect duty of gratitude at the individual
level. However, although some form of reciprocity,
indebtedness or gratitude may be part of someone’s indi-
vidual ﬁlial obligations, we claim that a theory of reci-
procity has too narrow a scope if it portrays the parents as
beneﬁting the child in childhood, and the adult child as the
benefactor of elderly parents later in life. A quite different
view on the parent–child relationship is offered by the
friendship model of ﬁlial obligations.
Duties emanating from friendship
The friendship model of ﬁlial obligation focuses not on
past favors or sacriﬁces by parents, but instead on the
present relationship between an adult child and her parent.
Adult children, it is argued, do not owe their parents any-
thing in the sense of favors that need to be returned. What
adult children owe their parents according to this argument
is solely based on the present relationship between them,
which ideally, is one of friendship. What parents have done
for their children in the past is in this view considered as
voluntarily distributed favors, of which it can only be
hoped that they will lead to a form of friendship, in which
support is exchanged out of a liking for each other (English
1979; Dixon 1995). English distinguishes two kinds of
favors. In English’ argumentation of the friendship model,
1 With ‘favor’, English means ‘requested favor’, because ‘unre-
quested sacriﬁces do not themselves create debts’ (p. 354).
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need to be returned, for instance if I ask my neighbor to
look after my house during my holiday. But if I do not ask
anything and in my absence the neighbor is so kind as to
mow my lawn twice weekly, this is not a favor that needs
to be returned, but rather a kindness which may be
responded to with a favor in return. In this last case,
however, this would be done purely out of friendship, and
not because I owe the neighbor anything. According to
English, the favors of parents are more like mowing the
lawn without being asked to. She concludes that adult
children have no obligation towards their elderly parents,
although they may consider doing them a favor in return, if
they feel friendly towards them, and wish to cultivate their
friendship. English acknowledges that previous sacriﬁces
from the part of the parent may play a role in forming the
friendship between parents and children, but emphasizes
the importance of the current relationship. In addition, she
stresses that the only appropriate motive for providing
support, like the one in friendship, is love and concern
about the other’s welfare. Seen from this angle, if adult
children unfortunately enough have no friendly feelings for
their parents, they owe their parents nothing. As long as the
friendship exists, friends are supposed to behave towards
each other in a way that is appropriate in their friendship,
which may include the exchange of favors in order to
sustain the friendship. But when the friendship is over, the
obligation to act as friends is over, and no favors are owed
anymore, according to English. However, the experience of
feelings of obligation for elderly parents is frequent, even if
one does not feel friendly towards them, as Dixon (1995)
acknowledges. To accommodate this feeling in the theory,
Dixon extends the argument, such that for old times’ sake
we may feel obligated to those who are no longer our
friends, although not so much as to our current friends
2
(Dixon 1995).
In contrast to the reciprocity argument, the friendship
argument of ﬁlial obligations focuses on the current rela-
tionship of adult children and elderly parents, and it accepts
that adult children’s support to their parents is contingent
on these emotions. It makes a strong and attractive argu-
ment against a rigid rule of ‘repayment’ in favor of ﬂexi-
bility in support giving in connection with the type of
relationship experienced. Why then would we object to
such a model? We wish to mention two arguments.
3 One of
the reasons one could bring forward is that the continuous
stream of favors ﬂowing from parents to children involves
more than an unrequested favor like mowing the lawn
while you are on holiday.
4 And although lifelong gratitude
may be asking too much in the case of a deteriorated
parent–child relationship, one has to be very cynical if
these past favors do not at least inspire some feeling of
gratitude or indebtedness, regardless of them being per-
formed by parents, neighbors or strangers. This rebuttal is a
general one, applicable to any relationship in which one
person is beneﬁted very much by another person, but it is a
feature which is present in many parent–child relationships.
The other reason for not fully embracing the friendship
model of ﬁlial obligation, and one which is cited by Dixon,
is that the parent–child relationship simply is not a rela-
tionship between friends. One of the features of friendship
is that the relationship is voluntarily engaged in by two
separate people. This is clearly not the case in parent–child
relationships. According to Dixon, the fact that the parent–
child relationship does not conform to this model need not
pose a problem. We could ‘‘recognise a multiplicity of
types of friendship’’, and parent–child relationships,
although different, may be ‘‘genuine friendships nonethe-
less’’ (Dixon 1995, p. 81–82). Our objection against this
attempt to incorporate the parent–child relationship in the
realm of friendships is that it passes over a distinguishing
feature of the parent–child relationship almost as if it
doesn’t matter, whereas other scholars claim it to be the
very basis of ﬁlial obligations: the involuntary nature of the
relationship (Mills 2003; Keller 2006). Far from excluding
friendship as a possible basis of ﬁlial actions, we are
inclined to think that friendly feelings may be a motivator
for support giving, but that it is not the only possible one. It
seems rather that feelings of friendship may shape the
amount and form of support giving of adult children to
their parents, but that the basis for ﬁlial obligations lies
elsewhere.
Parents’ need as the basis for obligations
One could also say that adult children have an obligation
towards their parents because they are in a unique position
to provide the support needed. This line of thought is
proposed by Goodin (1985), who presents a principle of
protecting the vulnerable, and by Miller (2003), who sees
ﬁlial obligations as a special case of beneﬁcence, an
imperfect Kantian duty.
ProtectingthevulnerableaccordingtoGoodinmeansthat
‘‘if one party is in a position of particular vulnerability to or
dependency on another, the other has strong responsibilities
2 But note that this still excludes ﬁlial obligations if no friendly
feelings were ever present.
3 An additional counterargument to English’ position was pointed out
to us by an anonymous reviewer, and is based on the observation that
the parent–child relationship is one based on inequality, implying that
even when parents become as vulnerable as children, they will never
have that role, but remain parents.
4 In addition, one can question whether it is true that children do not
ask for certain favors. In their behavior and needs, they can ‘ask’
without explicitly saying what they ask for.
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why adult children have special responsibilities towards
their parents is ‘‘precisely because their parents are most
vulnerable to them; and the most important component of
their vulnerability is emotional rather than material’’
(Goodin 1985, p. 88–89). Exactly how responsible someone
is for someone else depends in this model on how strongly
the otherparty isaffectedbythe agent’s actions andwhether
there are alternative sources to guarantee the other party’s
well being. It does not matter how the situation came into
being, or whether other persons have a causal role in creat-
ing the situation. What matters is only whether the other
party is vulnerable to the agent’s actions at the time of
acting.
According to Miller, the need of elderly parents obliges
their adult children to act on the duty of beneﬁcence,
implying that ‘‘adult children must promote their aging
parents’ ends and happiness as those aging parents con-
ceive of them’’ (Miller 2003, p. 193). But why should
parents have any special status in Kant’s principle of
beneﬁcence, when all persons are morally equal? Miller’s
answer is that the difference between promoting the ends of
just anyone in need and those of one’s own parents is that
the parent’s needs are more present. ‘For in wishing I can
be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can,
without violating the universality of the maxim, vary the
degree greatly in accordance with the different object of
my love.’ (quote Kant by Miller 2003, p. 185).
Kittay (1999) criticizes the principle of vulnerability by
saying that needs-based claims may not be legitimate,
depending on the history of the situation. If a distant
admirer claims that a certain person is the only one who
can make him happy, that would make the distant admirer
extremely vulnerable to this person’s actions, yet no one
will claim that she needs to fulﬁll his needs (Kittay’s
example).
Collingridge and Miller argue that from the existence of
the need alone, we cannot deduce that adult children are the
ones who are responsible for alleviating the need: ‘‘The
existence of needs generates obligations on someone or
other to satisfy those needs, but not adult children in par-
ticular’’ (Collingridge and Miller 1997, p. 124). In the same
line, saliency of the need does not seem enough to explain
why we should care for our parents, and not for instance for
our elderly neighbor, whose needs may be at least as salient
to us. We suspect that it is not saliency which is important,
but something like emotional closeness, maybe shared
history or in any case something that binds the adult child
to the elderly parent in a morally relevant way.
It seems fair to say that the legitimacy of a needs-based
claim depends on the type of claim and the relationship
between claimant and potential benefactor. Some types of
vulnerability do not produce legitimate claims, as in the
example of the distant admirer. But if someone close to me,
with whom I have a relational history, is vulnerable to my
actions, his needs are meaningful to me. This does not
mean that I should provide whatever the vulnerable party
sees as their need. But because of our relationship I owe the
other person a careful consideration of his needs.
A need alone cannot function as a moral guideline to
decide who is responsible for satisfying the need, because
the signiﬁcance of the need and the obligation to fulﬁll it
cannot be separated from the context in which the need
arises. The relationship between an elderly parent and an
adult child seems an appropriate context in which needs of
one party are meaningful to the other party, but an argu-
ment based on needs alone cannot sufﬁciently explain why
this is so. What is needed, is a clariﬁcation of the rela-
tionship between adult children and their elderly parents
which shows why adult children would have a larger than
average responsibility to satisfy needs of their elderly
parents.
Filial obligations as an assumed promise
According to Hoff Sommers (1986), conventional expec-
tations arise in certain social structures, such as friendship
or nurturing relationships, and these expectations are
comparable to making promises. In promising, the promi-
see can lay a claim on what the promiser has agreed to do.
If parent–child relationships can be compared with rela-
tionships between promiser and promisee, and conven-
tional expectations to promises, then the parent has a
‘right’ to what they expect from their children. In this view,
the promise of the parent–child relationship is that adult
children be ‘‘grateful, loyal, attentive, respectful and def-
erential to parents’’ (Hoff Sommers 1986, p. 447).
There are problems in the comparison of conventional
expectations with a promise. It is true that promises oblige,
but expectations simply do not have the same status, even
if they arise in certain conventional relationship structures.
To ﬁrst equate conventional expectations with promises,
and thus deduce obligations from conventions is at best an
indirect way of describing obligations, as Smith points out:
Why would we need to pretend that there is an unspoken
promise when in fact there is not? At worst, the argument
begs the question. Compare this view with the friendship
view of ﬁlial obligations and the case (Smith 1993) of the
neighbor spontaneously mowing my lawn in my absence.
The neighbor might expect a favor in return, but I did not
promise anything. To suggest that because of the neigh-
bor’s expectations I have a duty to provide the neighbor
with a favor in return makes too much of expectations,
however reasonable they may be. If I owe the neighbor a
favor in return, it is not because of her expectations, but
because of what she has done for me. Such an idea comes
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parents who do not expect anything from their children, but
rather hope for a pleasurable sustained relationship? Do
high expectations oblige children more than low expecta-
tions? Finally, there is the impossibility of being ‘‘grateful,
loyal, attentive, respectful and deferential’’ out of duty.
Such feelings are hard to experience ‘on demand’. It is also
questionable whether an aging parent will be satisﬁed if a
son grudgingly performs an obligation to do the grocery
shopping. Hoff Sommers’ answer to this observation is that
duty and feelings are not mutually exclusive, but that duty
comes ﬁrst, if only to protect those whom no-one feels
friendly to. But the question remains whether fulﬁlling
these obligations and being a good carer is ever possible
out of duty alone. According to Tronto (1993), good care is
only possible with a sensitivity to the other person’s need
that is hard to imagine when provided without at least some
empathy. It remains difﬁcult to view ﬁlial obligations
within a discourse on duties and rights. The variety of
parent–child relationships and the fact that one has little
choice in establishing this relationship with a particular
person makes it difﬁcult to deﬁne rigid duties as in the case
of conscious choice, for which one is accountable.
Obligation stemming from the special good of a parent–
child relationship
Although not many scholars have recently addressed the
question of ﬁlial obligation, those who have defended some
form of ﬁlial obligation have advocated a ‘special goods
theory’ (Mills 2003; Keller 2006). Keller comments that
‘‘one of the reasons why the prevailing accounts of ﬁlial
duty fail (…), is that they try to explain it by analogy,
saying that being someone’s grown child is just like being
in someone’s debt, or the recipient of someone’s benevo-
lence, or someone’s friend. But being someone’s child is
not really like any of these things’’ (Keller 2006, p. 264).
One of the special features of the parent–child relation-
ship––as all family relationships––is that it is unchosen.
Claudia Mills (2003) focuses on this feature in her account
of ﬁlial obligations. We are simply stuck with the family
we have and cannot decide to ﬁnd new family, as we can in
the case of friends. This is clear in the case of children.
Children simply happen to be born to the parents they have.
But Mills points out that the same could be said about
parents. Although they––in this time, in our society, usu-
ally––decide to become parents, they do not choose the
particular child they will be the parents of. They get a
child, love it and care for it, whoever the child turns out to
be. According to Mills that is exactly why the relationship
is so valuable. In no other relationship do people take up
such unconditional and far-reaching commitments as when
they decide to care for a child, their child, no matter who
this child turns out to be. The unconditional nature of most
parents’ love for their child is bound up with the unchosen
character of it. If we could choose what kind of child we
wanted to love, there would not be the same unconditional
acceptance of whatever person this turns out to be. For
children, it means that they are loved not because of who
they are, but because of the relationship with the person
who loves them. In practically no other human relationship
is love so unconditionally given. The same is true for the
child’s love for the parent: it is given unconditionally, and
without choice. According to Mills, ‘‘It is a great good to
be in a relationship that is enduring and unconditional’’
(Mills 2003, p. 152). For Keller, ‘‘A healthy parent–child
relationship adds value to the life of both parent and child
for as long as it exists’’ (Keller 2006, p. 265).
Both Mills and Keller in similar ways distinguish two
sorts of goods (Keller) or ends (Mills) in relation to the
adult child––elderly parent relationship. Keller speaks of
generic versus speciﬁc goods which are the product of the
relationship between parents and children. Generic goods
are those which can be obtained in a parent–child rela-
tionship, but ‘‘could just as well be provided by others’’
(Keller 2006, p. 266). Speciﬁc goods on the other hand are
goods that can only be obtained in this particular rela-
tionship. A parent may for example value a child’s keeping
in contact, but not because she values someone––anyone––
to call and talk to her. According to Keller, ‘‘the good in
question is the good of having your child, the one you
raised, love and care about, make an effort to keep in
touch’’ (Keller 2006, p. 266).
5 According to Mills, the good
is being in the relationship itself. We can add that the
relationship, besides being a good in its own right, is a
portal to extended family relationships. The parent–child
relationship is the node through which all other family
relationships are connected, be they grandparents, siblings,
uncles, aunts or nephews. Having family and being con-
nected to others may add to one’s sense of belonging in the
world. This good, this having a family and being somehow
connected to other people in this world, although a deriv-
ative from the parent–child relationship, must be consid-
ered a special good as well, because no other way exists to
obtain the good. Because the parent–child relationship is a
great good to both parties in the relationship, Mills says
their duty is to continue the relationship. Mills argues that
what the parties in the relationship owe to each other are
those goods that can only be obtained in the relationship,
and not goods than can be obtained elsewhere.
6 This means
5 Mill’s distinction between ‘value-intrinsic’ and ‘value-extrinsic’
ends of institutions is a similar distinction between generic and
particular beneﬁts of a relationship, and we will not discuss it here.
6 Keller makes a similar argument, but does not follow it through as
rigorously as Mills does. This is why we follow Mills determination
of duties here.
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contact and interest in each other’s lives is.
Obligations to care for or provide support to elderly
parents
We will now put some situations to the test and see where
our point of view leads us in concrete cases.
Personal care and other services
An interesting case is how we should regard personal care
and other services adult children often provide their par-
ents. Are these special goods that cannot be obtained
elsewhere, and is it therefore a duty to provide these goods
to elderly parents? In many cases, we believe they are not
special goods. As regards personal care, empirical research
shows that most elderly parents in our society prefer formal
care instead of informal care, and that the majority of adult
children do not wish to provide hands-on care for their
elderly parents either (Dykstra and Fokkema 2007; Stuif-
bergen et al. 2011). They would feel embarrassed by such
an arrangement, judging personal care as inappropriate in
the parent–child relationship. Thus, providing each other
with the special goods of the relationship does not include a
duty to provide personal care. However, things might be
different if personal care from the child was a strong wish
of the parent. In that case, the good of considerate, personal
care might not be obtainable elsewhere. Then the question
becomes relevant whether we ought to provide others with
a good they cannot obtain from someone else. We have
rejected such a duty above, with the criticism Kittay raised
against the argument of vulnerability. Instead, we think the
right focus here is on the relationship in which the request
arises, what status the request has, and how much one feels
it is appropriate in the relationship to provide what is asked
for. As such, it is not different from any other request that
turns up in the course of a relationship. If one feels inclined
to agree to the request that is ﬁne, and we can imagine there
are many requests adult children wish to comply with
wholeheartedly. But there is no duty to do so. Our position
implies that elderly parents cannot claim services from
their adult children. Not personal care, but not other ser-
vices either. Surely many will object in a way that will go
something like this: ‘‘Look, if my mum has a garden but
can no longer mow the lawn, isn’t it logical that I do it for
her if I can? Wouldn’t I be a bad daughter if I just let her sit
with it?’’ Our answer would be that, if that is the way you
feel about it, ﬁne, and yes, please mow the lawn if you can.
But if you hate mowing lawns, or live faraway, or simply
consider yourself too busy to be bothered about mowing
lawns, then the general answer would be: Your mother
likes to have a garden. If she likes the garden, and likes to
have a mown lawn but cannot mow it herself, she has to
arrange for a gardener to mow her lawn. Or a friendly
neighbor, for that matter. Maybe the objection would be
that it would be too costly to hire all sorts of services that
could easily be provided by the average healthy person. We
suspect that many of the services rendered by adult chil-
dren (and by family members and friends in general) are in
fact a way of cost-containment. There is nothing wrong
with that, as long as adult children feel happy to provide
the services needed. But it is not a general duty.
Let us now take the argument to the extreme and picture
an elderly father in an old, leaky house. The heater is
broke, the sewer is clogged, the dishes are dirty, and dad is
feeling depressed. Surely it would not be enough to come
and visit once in a while, talk about the weather and say
goodbye again? Wouldn’t it be the child’s duty to call a
plumber, tidy up and invite father over to stay at her place
for a while? At ﬁrst glance, it seems harder to maintain that
the adult child has no obligation to help father out. But at
second thoughts we should be concerned with how the
situation has come about. Father’s problems should have
been noted earlier in the sequence of events. And this is not
solely the adult child’s responsibility. The father’s
responsibility should not be overlooked, and this consists
of ﬁrst, taking care of himself and second, if he has trouble
doing that, communicating this to others who can help him.
If father takes the relationship with his child seriously, he
has an obligation to communicate his problems at an earlier
stage. If both parties wish to maintain a meaningful rela-
tionship, this is the father’s obligation as much as the
child’s. Had the father communicated his problems earlier
in time, it might not have been too difﬁcult for the adult
child to help father out, or help him sort himself out. We
cannot say that the seriousness of the situation suddenly
imposes extra duties on the adult child. Again, many adult
children will wish to help their father in such circum-
stances. In a normal relationship, it would be unusual to
completely leave the father to fend for himself. But the
obligations of adult children do not include far-reaching
caring tasks, if they are not inclined to do so.
The case of dementia
Do we have a duty to continue the relationship if the parent
is not capable of participating in the relationship anymore?
According to Mills not: ‘‘One implication of my view,
which some will view as welcome, some as unwelcome, is
that the obligation to participate in an ongoing relationship
continues only when the relationship itself remains possi-
ble’’ (Mills 2003, p. 163). She considers care for a
demented parent not as maintaining the relationship:
‘‘Heartless as it may seem to say this, I see little point in
68 M. C. Stuifbergen, J. J. M. Van Delden
123spending extensive time with someone who does not know
me for who I am’’ (Mills 2003, p. 163).
We think Mills may be wrong here, and will argue that
duties to aging parents do not end completely if the parent
is demented and not capable of taking part in the rela-
tionship any longer. If we agree that continuing the rela-
tionship is an important obligation, and agree that it is not
possible to have a one-sided relationship, then why should
we doubt that the obligation ends when it is impossible to
have a satisfactory mutual relationship? One reason is that
it is hard to point out when exactly a relationship is over. It
is often documented that patients with dementia react well
to the presence of a well-known person, however estranged
from the world around them they may be. It would be
wrong to think that the relationship is valuable only in the
case of equal or similar contributions to it. Even in the
friendship model––with friendship as a blueprint for bal-
anced relationships––there is room for a continued rela-
tionship even if the balance of favors has tipped to one
side. ‘‘For old times’ sake’’, we may continue to feel
obligated when a friendship is over, out of respect for the
former friendship (Dixon 1995). If a relationship has been
mutually satisfying, we suggest that it is still our duty not
to deny the other party the good of continuing the rela-
tionship, especially when this can be done with little cost to
ourselves. In the situation described the parent is vulnera-
ble to the adult child’s actions. We do not have a moral
duty to respond to every claim made on the basis of vul-
nerability––see our discussion of the vulnerability argu-
ment above. But in this case the need of the parent is
legitimate because of the shared history. It does not seem
right to end contact completely because one of the parties
in the relationship is against their will excluded from
consciously participating in it. The content of the rela-
tionship will certainly change, but that is no reason to end
the relationship completely.
But there are more reasons not to end the relationship,
reasons tied to the relationship itself, which we feel ﬂow
naturally from the original argument. One of them is the
value of knowing that the relationship continues even when
one is not consciously aware of it, and no longer has
control over the relationship. The prospect of having
someone you know and trust at your side when you are no
longer consciously aware of what is going on around you
will color the relationship at the time you are aware of it.
To know that someone cares for you even when there
seems no reason to do so anymore may strengthen the
relationship at the time when there is no need for such care.
To continue the relationship also when the parent is
demented, is in fact the mirror image of the unconditional
love the parent feels for a child. No-one would choose to
build up a relationship with a demented person because of
the person’s characteristics, but if this demented person is
your mother, you continue the relationship because it is
there and you are an important part of it.
At the same level of argument, we wish to argue that one
should continue the relationship because the way one
experiences a relationship now colors the perception of the
relationship in past times. To abandon one’s demented
parent may lead to a devaluation of the moments once
shared together, whereas to continue contact may enrich
the moments lived before
7.
These arguments to continue the relationship with a
demented parent have nothing to do with gratitude or
vulnerability. They are concerned with preserving the
relationship because it continues to provide beneﬁts to both
parties, albeit of a different kind.
What if someone does not care?
According to Mills, we have an obligation to continue the
relationship because of the great good it is and the special
goods it provides. Although this seems a credible conclu-
sion, it might be that this step is taken a bit too quickly.
What if someone just does not care, and is not interested in
the good of the kind between parents and children? Why
would that person still be obliged to maintain the rela-
tionship? If we only have a duty to maintain the relation-
ship when it provides us with the special goods it is
intended to, then there would not be a reason to continue
the relationship when it does not. Mills leaves room for the
discontinuation of the relationship if this is more harmful
than beneﬁcial, but points out that as long as the relation-
ship has the potential of offering the special goods it could
provide, we have a duty to continue it. But what if someone
does not see the point of continuing the relationship, not
because the relationship is harmful, but because it does not
bring her anything she considers valuable? It is hard to see
how a continuation of the relationship would be obliged in
that case, without either paternalistically imposing our
family values on others, or referring to something as rec-
iprocity, gratitude or vulnerability. But even though we
cannot point out an obligation to do so, it is probably with
some idea of reciprocity, or some respect for the history of
the relationship that adult children ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deny
their parents their keeping in touch completely, even if
sometimes they have to go to great lengths to do so. Most
of us have some idea that the relationship is a special one
and for that reason try harder to maintain it. But if, as in the
example above, someone genuinely does not see the point
of being in a relationship with one’s parent, it would be
very paternalistic to maintain that it is still an obligation
7 One may also beneﬁt from continuing the relationship because
taking care of others may make one a better person, as suggested to us
by an anonymous reviewer.
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good.
Conclusion
One of the welcome aspects of an account of ﬁlial obli-
gation based on special goods is that it arrives at a plausible
and well-deﬁned description of adult children’s duties
8––at
least clearer than any of the other accounts. Maintaining
the relationship does not exclude providing other goods,
but this is supererogatory. The obligation to maintain the
relationship is not dependent on the actual beneﬁts the
child received. It thus circumvents problems observed with
the argument of reciprocity. It is also based on a more
credible account of the relationship than the friendship
argument offers. Although friendly feelings may be pres-
ent, most of us experience that family bonds are unlike
friendships and carry some obligation with them. Doing
one’s best to maintain the relationship seems the minimum
required. We have argued that maintaining the relationship
is a duty also when one of the parties is no longer capable
of being an equal partner in the relationship because of
dementia. How much more parents and adult children wish
to do for each other on top of their maintaining the rela-
tionship is up to their own discretion, and will depend on
the content of their relationship. Because both parties are in
a meaningful relationship, the needs of an elderly parent
have a moral force, and adult children will often want to
comply with them, in the light of the relationship they
value. But it is not the duty of an adult child to provide for
their parent ﬁnancially, or by taking up demanding care
tasks. It is up to the actors in the relationship to decide the
exact content of the relationship, as long as they are
maintaining it.
This is then what we claim our ﬁlial obligation regard-
ing care for elderly parents is: to maintain the relationship,
and by maintaining contact, trying to be sensitive to one’s
elderly parents’ needs. If there is at least a minimal rela-
tionship with the parent possible, our duty is a duty to care
about our parents, in the way that Tronto (1993) describes
as the ﬁrst phase of caring: ‘‘noting the existence of a need
and making an assessment that this need should be met’’(p.
106). What should be done when a need is perceived
depends on the context of the relationship. Caring about an
elderly parent does not necessarily entail care-giving.I n
most instances it will probably mean taking care of aspects
of the situation, for instance supervising the care provided
by others.
Policy implications
If ﬁlial obligations are no more than a personal duty to try
and maintain the relationship with one’s elderly parents,
then certainly all policy attempts that try and force members
of a family to provide more informal care must be rejected.




by Daniels (1988) en by Jecker (2002), arguing from a
framework of justice. It would be unjust for some to have to
take up large care tasks, depriving them of many other
opportunities in life. It would also be unjust that only those
with adult children willing and able to take care of them
should receive the care they need. This task should therefore
not be assigned to adult children, but instead to public ser-
vices, leaving open possibilities for support to parents and
children who wish to provide care within the family circle.
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